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Tractarian Form  
as the Precursor to Forms of Life 
Abstract 
Interpreters are divided on the question of whether the phrase ‘form 
of life’ is used univocally in Wittgenstein’s later writings. Some 
univocal interpreters suggest that, for Wittgenstein, ‘form of life’ 
captures a uniquely biological notion: the biologically human form of 
life. Others suggest that it captures a cultural notion: the notion of 
differently enculturated forms of human life. Non-univocal 
interpreters, in contrast, argue that Wittgenstein does not use ‘form of 
life’ univocally, but that he uses it sometimes to highlight a cluster of 
biological notions and sometimes a cluster of cultural ones. 
The debate between univocal and non-univocal readers has 
generated a raft of intricate, illuminating literature on both sides. If it 
remains to an extent open, it is partly as a result of the fact that the 
textual evidence available on this matter, in Wittgenstein’s later 
published and unpublished writings, is so limited. In this paper, I 
argue that considering Wittgenstein’s earlier treatment of ‘form’ can 
help to shed light on his later treatment of ‘form of life’. More 
specifically I argue that revisiting the Tractatus’ treatment of ‘form’ 
gives us – perhaps surprisingly – reasons to support a non-univocal later 
reading of ‘forms of life’. 
Introduction 
Interpreters are divided on the question of whether the phrase 
‘form of life’ is used univocally in Wittgenstein’s later writings. For 
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the sake of clarity, I will, in what follows, use the expressions 
‘univocal interpreters’ and ‘non-univocal interpreters’ to distinguish 
the two positions.
 
Some univocal interpreters suggest that, for 
Wittgenstein, ‘form of life’ captures a uniquely biological notion: 
the biologically human form of life (as opposed to the forms of life 
of biologically non-human animals) (e.g. Garver 1994). Others 
suggest that it captures a cultural notion: the notion of differently 
enculturated forms of human life (e.g. Baker & Hacker 2009). The 
former emphasise the idea of a universally human life over that of a 
plurality of human lives and the biological over the cultural; the 
latter reverse these emphases.
1  
According to both, however, the 
expression ‘form of life’ is used univocally to pick one or other of 
these notions: the biological or the cultural.  
Non-univocal interpreters, in contrast, argue that Wittgenstein 
does not use ‘form of life’ univocally, but that he uses it sometimes 
to highlight a cluster of biological notions and sometimes a cluster 
of cultural ones (see e.g. Moyal-Sharrock “Wittgenstein of Forms 
of Life, Patterns of Life and Forms of Being” in this issue of NWR, 
Vol. 4 Special Issue 2015. What is more: the decision not to use 
this expression univocally is not mere stylistic accident or 
terminological sloppiness on Wittgenstein’s part, but rather the 
expression of a central underlying commitment: the commitment 
to resisting sharp theoretical divides between the biological and the 
cultural, to the extent of even positing an internal relation (rather 
than a division) between the two (Majetschak 2010: 75-77). 
This debate has generated a raft of intricate, illuminating 
literature on both sides. If it remains to an extent open, it is partly 
because the textual evidence available in Wittgenstein’s later 
published and unpublished writings (including the Philosophical 
Investigations and On Certainty) is so limited. In this paper, I 
propose to show that considering Wittgenstein’s earlier treatment 
of ‘form’ can help to shed light on his later treatment of ‘form of 
life’. More specifically I shall argue that revisiting the Tractatus’ 
                                                          
1
 I am borrowing this distinction between the unitary notion of a human form of life and 
the idea of a multiplicity of forms of human life from Danièle Moyal-Sharrock (2003: 
125–148), who in turn draws it from Gertrude Conway (1989). 
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treatment of ‘form’ gives us reasons to support  – perhaps 
surprisingly – a non-univocal reading of ‘forms of life’. 
The idea that revisiting the Tractatus can shed light on this 
material is echoed by Wittgenstein in the Philosophical Investigations, 
when he writes: 
Here the term ‘language-game’ is meant to bring into prominence the 
fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of 
life. Review the multiplicity of language-games in the following 
examples and in others: 
Giving order, and obeying them– 
Describing the appearance of an object, or giving its 
measurements –  
[…] 
Asking, thanking, cursing, greeting, praying. 
– It is interesting to compare the multiplicity of the tools in language 
and of the ways they are used, the multiplicity of kinds of word and 
sentence, with what logicians have said about the structure of 
language. (Including the author of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.) (PI 
23 [my italics in the first instance]) 
This explicit reference to the Tractatus in PI 23 is often read as 
suggesting a straightforward disanalogy between Wittgenstein’s 
earlier and later approaches to language: in the Tractatus, 
Wittgenstein is blind to the ‘multiplicity of kinds of word and 
sentence’; in the Philosophical Investigations, by contrast, he embraces 
this multiplicity.
2
 In my view, this is mistaken. What is more, a 
careful examination of the Tractatus’ discussion of form reveals that 
Wittgenstein is already, at that early stage, working non-univocally, 
with multiple and internally related, understandings of form: the term 
‘form’ is sometimes used to capture the universal aspects of 
representation (as in ‘logical form’) and sometimes to capture a 
multiplicity of representational systems (as the representational 
form of pictures and the forms of scientific systems). In this 
respect, the early Wittgenstein is not blind to linguistic multiplicity 
                                                          
2
 For an emphasis on this idea of discontinuity see, for instance, Ian Proops  (2001: 384). 
Danièle Moyal-Sharrock emphasises the continuities between Wittgenstein’s early notion 
of form and his later notion of form of life, albeit in ways that differ from mine (2004: 
31–40).  
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in the Tractatus, although his logician’s emphasis on truth-functional 
representation does render salient for him types of linguistic activity 
that lose their centrality in his later philosophy. By bringing the 
Tractatus’ treatment of form into sharper focus, we become able to 
draw a more accurate comparison between his earlier and later 
approaches to language – precisely the comparison that PI 23 
invites us to draw.  
The Tractatus’ discussion of form emerges in the midst of two 
separate but interconnected discussions: a discussion of pictures 
and a discussion of scientific representational systems. I will 
examine each of these briefly in turn in sections 1, 2 and 3. In 
section 4, I will then be in a position to turn to the question of how 
Wittgenstein’s early treatment of form helps to shed light on his 
later treatment of forms of life.   
1. The Tractatus on the Forms of Pictures3 
Before turning to Wittgenstein’s early discussion of form, I need to 
say a few words about his notion of a picture. The Tractarian 
notion of a picture aims to capture the use we make of signs to 
assert possible states (i.e. possibilities that may obtain or fail to 
obtain and which determinately do one or the other – TLP 2.11). 
Pictures come in a variety of media according to the Tractatus: 
propositional pictures are expressed by signs (i.e. words) in the 
medium of language; mental pictures (i.e. thoughts) are expressed 
in the medium of psychical signs; in turn, iconic pictures come in a 
variety of media and include not only figurative paintings and 
drawings, but also figurative statues, models made up of any 
number of materials, etc.
4
  
                                                          
3
 I will be using the Ogden translation of the Tractatus (abbreviated to ‘TLP’), unless 
otherwise specified.  
4
 That Wittgenstein regards propositions and thoughts to be pictures in different media – i.e. 
respectively, in the media of words and of psychical signs – emerges in his 
correspondence (NB: 131 – Letter to Russell, Cassino, 19.8.19.). Thought, in the Tractatus, 
includes all pictures in the medium of psychical signs (all mental pictures), including 
experiences and beliefs (cf. Hacker,1986: ch. 3). That models and representational 
drawings are also regarded as pictures emerges in discussion of the model used in the law-
court in Paris in NB 24.9.14. It is also amply demonstrated by Susan Sterrett (2006: ch. 8). 
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For Wittgenstein, pictures (in all media) are ultimately 
analysable into simple names that designate simple meanings (or 
objects) (TLP 2.12, TLP 2.13, TLP 2.131). Different pictures of the 
same possible state will thus coincide at the ultimate level of 
analysis and will do so even if they are pictures in altogether 
different media: “One could therefore say the real name is that 
which all symbols, which signify an object, have in common” (TLP 
3.3411). 
Since different pictures (in different media) of the same possible 
state are ultimately analysable into the same logical arrangements of 
the same real names, real names are the ultimate constituents of all 
pictures (including thoughts and iconic pictures) – not just of 
propositions. I will use the expression ‘elementary picture’ to 
capture the idea of what comes into view when one carries out the 
complete analyses of pictures in different media representing the 
same possible state: namely, that all of their analyses ultimately 
converge on the same determinate arrangements of the same ‘real 
names’.
5
  
One important difference between elementary and non-
elementary pictures lies, for Wittgenstein, in their degree of 
ambiguity. Non-elementary pictures, including non-elementary 
propositions, manifest a degree of ambiguity that is lacking at the 
fully analysed level. Indeed, we use everyday, non-elementary 
expressions without a clear grasp of their ‘logic’, of their complete 
logical structure – and thus without grasping the meanings of the 
names that emerge at the ultimate level of their analyses: 
Everyday language is a part of the human organism and is no less 
complicated than it. […]  
Language disguises […] thought; so that from the external form of the 
clothes one cannot infer the form of the thought they clothe, because 
the external form of the clothes is constructed with quite another 
object than to let the form of the body be recognized. […] 
                                                          
5
I will use the expressions ‘elementary proposition’ and ‘elementary picture’ 
interchangeably in what follows. 
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The tacit conventions on which the understanding of everyday 
language depends are enormously complicated. (TLP 4.002 [Pears & 
McGuiness translation for the last sentence])  
Whilst this feature of everyday language does not prevent it 
from fulfilling its varied purposes, it does introduce a level of 
ambiguity that would be absent if we could use language in its fully 
analysed form (TLP 3.323, TLP 3.324). The ‘tacit conventions’ 
(TLP 4.002) of everyday language are not geared towards logical 
precision and clarity: they are geared towards more practical goals, 
including (though not reduced to) those of facilitating our survival, 
by enabling us to communicate in an efficient and speedy manner 
crucial information about the state of reality. Logical precision and 
clarity require a process of analysis that is too time consuming for 
these everyday, practical purposes.  
One distinctive, though often overlooked aspect of 
Wittgenstein’s early view is that obtaining possible states, 
propositions, thoughts and iconic pictures are all facts (TLP 2, TLP 
2.141, TLP 3, TLP 3.14, TLP 5.542, TLP 5.5421). A fact, in this 
context, is an obtaining logically structured arrangement of 
elements: a fact is part of logical space, that is, of the space in which 
truth-functionality arises (TLP 1.13).
6
 Using the term ‘fact’ to cover 
both obtaining possible states and pictures (including thoughts and 
propositions) is not a mere terminological quirk on Wittgenstein’s 
part. It is part of a deep-level commitment to resisting traditional 
philosophical moves to divide reality (i.e. ‘the totality of facts’ – 
TLP 1.1) a priori with a view to drawing metaphysical conclusions 
from such divisions. For instance, Wittgenstein suggests in the 
Tractatus that solipsism – understood as a restrictive metaphysical 
view – begins by positing precisely such an a priori division of the 
contents of reality; and that this attempt is doomed to failure and 
inevitably subverts itself (Tejedor, 2015: ch. 2 & 3).  
                                                          
6
 A picture (be it a proposition, a thought or an iconic picture) is a fact in that it is a 
determinate logical arrangement of elements that mirrors the arrangement of elements in 
a possible state and thereby depicts or represents it; it is for this reason that a picture 
possesses a truth-functional structure. Logical complexity – that is, being a logically 
structured determinate arrangement of elements – is central both to the notion of possible 
state and to that of a fact. 
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Wittgenstein indicates that all facts (be they representing facts, 
such as propositions, thoughts and iconic pictures, or represented 
facts, such as obtaining possible states) are contingent. 
Propositions, thoughts and generally pictures are contingent in that 
they:  
(i) are either determinately true or determinately false 
[bivalence]  
(ii) are both capable of being true and capable of being false 
[bipolarity] 
(iii) purport to be informative about the reality 
[informativeness] 
(iv) ultimately decompose into elementary propositions that are 
logically independent from each other [logical independence] 
and that are made up exclusively of simple names [simplicity] 
 
In turn, possible states are contingent in that they: 
(i*) either determinately obtain or determinately fail to obtain  
(ii*) are both capable of obtaining and capable of failing to 
obtain 
(ii*) ultimately decompose into states of affairs that are logically 
independent from each other and that are exclusively made up 
of simple objects.7  
 
Furthermore, Wittgenstein distinguishes, in the Tractatus, between 
senseful propositions and senseless propositions such as 
tautologies and contradictions. Senseless propositions result from 
applying logical operations to (logically dependent) senseful 
                                                          
7
 Elementary propositions differ from non-elementary ones in that the former are 
logically independent from each other, whereas the latter need not be (TLP 4.211, TLP 
6.3751 and TLP 5.124 — 5.1241): elementary propositions are logically independent from 
one another in that the truth-value of one such propositions does not necessarily entail 
the truth-value of another. Similarly, states of affairs differ from logically more complex 
possible situations in that the former are logically independent from each other, whereas 
the latter need not be (TLP 2.061 and TLP 6.3751). I use the expression ‘possible state’ 
(or, at times, ‘state’) to capture both the notion of a state of affairs and that of a more 
complex possible situation. 
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propositions. Since elementary propositions are logically 
independent from each other, senseless propositions only arise at a 
higher level of complexity, when a sufficient number of logical 
operations have been applied to elementary propositions for 
internal relations of logical dependence to emerge. Senseless, 
uninformative propositions are a corollary of senseful language –
 they are ‘part of the symbolism’ (TLP 4.4611) – insofar as they 
result from applying logical operations to senseful propositions. 
They do not convey or indeed purport to convey information 
about reality, however: they do not depict possible states of the 
world, they say nothing (and purport to say nothing) about the 
state of reality (TLP 4.46; TLP 4.461) 
Whilst tautologies convey no information about reality, it could 
be thought that they are nevertheless informative in a different 
respect: perhaps they convey or communicate information, not 
about reality, but about logic itself. In Wittgenstein’s view, this 
betrays a misconception. His reasons for this are complex and have 
been examined in detail elsewhere (Sullivan 2000: 182-191, McGinn 
2006: ch.10, Proops 2000: ch. 1, Morris 2008: ch. 5). I will consider 
them here very briefly and only insofar as doing so proves relevant 
to shedding light on his Tractarian understanding of form and, 
thereby, his later conception of form of life.  
For Wittgenstein, traditional theories of logic (notably those 
developed by Frege and Russell) make the mistake of presenting 
logic as a body of doctrine consisting of contentful propositions 
akin to those of the natural sciences (McGinn 2006: ch. 9 & 10, 
Proops 2000: ch. 1). These theories present the propositions of 
logic as differing from those of the natural sciences only in their 
degree of generality. They thus present logic as the most general of 
sciences: a science dealing with the most general features of reality. 
For Wittgenstein, this has had a devastating effect on the traditional 
understanding of logical entailment, logical variables and formal 
concepts (McGinn 2006: ch. 3). For, in his view, the propositions 
of logic are not akin to senseful propositions. The traditional 
approach to logic attributes to the propositions of logic a 
foundational role and a content that they do not possess (TLP 6.1, 
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TLP 6.11, TLP 6.111, TLP 5.132).
8
 The laws or principles of logic, 
such as the laws of inference (in particular, modus ponens – cf. TLP 
6.1264) are senseless tautologies, according to Wittgenstein. They 
are ‘superfluous’ (TLP 5.132) in that they do not play the role of 
justifying, sanctioning, determining, guaranteeing or rendering 
possible inferences between propositions (McGinn 2006: 216, 
Dilman 1973: 101-102). For nothing outside the propositions need 
play this role: any inferences between propositions are justified 
quite simply by virtue of the internal relations that hold between 
these – the internal relations immanent (as it were) in the 
propositions themselves (cf. McGinn 2006: 215). Although the laws 
or principles of logic are superfluous in that they do not play the 
role of justifying or determining inferences, it is important to note 
that they are not altogether purposeless, for Wittgenstein. On the 
contrary, he admits that there are, ‘in real life’ (cf. PTLP 6.1221 & 
TLP 6.211) situations in which these principles are used with a 
purpose.
9
 For Wittgenstein, logical laws or principles, whilst 
superfluous with respect to the justification of inferences, can, ‘in 
real life’ be purposefully used to remind us of certain pertinent 
instructions in the use of signs: instructions that are already part of 
the system of representation we are operating in (hence the idea of 
this being a reminder), but, which, as a matter of psychological fact, 
we may happen to forget or misregard on occasion. Asking how we 
‘actually’– i.e. ‘in real life’ – use propositions such as ‘3 x 4 = 12’ or 
modus ponens for (PTLP 6.1221, TLP 6.211) enables us to see clearly 
that we merely use them as reminders – reminders made 
purposeful by certain facts about our psychology, rather than 
required by logic for justification (cf. Dilman 1973: ch. 11). 
                                                          
8
 In the German original, the first sentence of this entry reads: “Theorien, die einen Satz 
der Logik gehaltvoll erscheinen lassen, sind immer falsch.” 
9
 This emerges most clearly in the following entries from the Prototractatus: “Indeed in real 
life a logical proposition is never what we want. Rather, we make use of logical 
propositions only in inferences from propositions that do not belong to logic to others 
that likewise do not belong to logic” (PTLP 6.122); “In philosophy the question, ‘What do 
we actually use this word or this proposition for?’ repeatedly leads to valuable insights” 
(PTLP 6.1221). In the Tractatus, these remarks re-emerge, but are couched in terms of 
mathematical, rather than logical, propositions (TLP 6.211).  On this, see also (Dilman 
1973: ch. 10 & 11). Relatedly, see Juliet Floyd’s discussion of Wittgenstein’s later approach 
to mathematics (2009, 2012). 
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For related reasons, Wittgenstein suggests that the traditional 
approach to logic misrepresents the role and status of variables 
(McGinn 2006: 230). The traditional approach to logic defended by 
Frege and Russell presents variables as generalised, representing 
elements of senseful propositions. This approach is wholly 
distorting, however, and inevitably leads to philosophical pseudo-
problems and dead ends.
10
 Variables should not be treated as if 
they are special (i.e. maximally general) representing parts of 
propositions. They should instead be understood as instructions for 
the combination of signs, instructions in the imperative (rather than 
indicative) mood along the lines of: use in this way.
11
 In the case of 
the proposition, the variable in question is the general propositional 
form (TLP 4.53). This variable – the general propositional form – 
is akin to the instruction: use signs in such a way as to express such 
and such is the case (TLP 4.5). This notion of an instruction is central to 
Wittgenstein’s early understanding of form. I will return to it 
shortly. 
The Tractatus’ discussion of form is predicated on a distinction 
Wittgenstein draws between the ‘essential’ and the ‘accidental’ 
features of pictures (cf. TLP 3.34). The essential features of a 
picture are those features that are essential to representation, 
without which the picture would not be able to represent at all: 
they are, in other words, those features universally possessed by all 
pictures. In turn, the accidental features of pictures are features 
without which representation is still possible, features that arise 
from the accidental way in which the signs in question have been 
generated or produced. This contrast between the accidental and 
the essential aspects of pictures is crucial to the distinction 
between, on the one hand, the notion of representational form and, 
                                                          
10
 Consider, for example, Russell’s discussion of variables as part of his Theory of Types. 
Russell’s portrayal of variables as general expressions standing for any term leads him to a 
series of paradoxes that ultimately force him to impose restrictions over the range of 
variables. In Wittgenstein’s view, Russell’s difficulties become entrenched because Russell 
starts off with a mistaken understanding of the role of variables in general propositions. 
11
 McGinn puts this point by saying that ‘a variable is a rule for constructing the class of 
propositions that are its values’ (2006: 230). For reasons I discuss in (2015: ch. 5), I prefer 
to use the term ‘instruction’ here and to reserve the term ‘rule’ [‘Regel’] for a different 
purpose, following Wittgenstein’s own use.    
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on the other, the notions of logical structure, pictorial form and 
logical form. 
Representational form encapsulates the conventions that render 
representation in a particular medium possible: the criteria for 
correct representation in that particular pictorial medium (or pictorial 
system) (TLP 2.173).
12
 For instance, it belongs to the medium of 
models that representations in this medium involve three-
dimensionality. If I am to represent anything in the medium of 
models, I must use three-dimensional shapes – this, after all, is 
what counts as representing via models. A piece of clay that has been 
extended and thinned out to become a two-dimensional sheet 
cannot be used as a model. Similarly, if I am to represent anything in 
the medium of painting, I must use more than one shade of colour: 
a monochrome sheet cannot be used to represent in the medium of 
paintings.
13
 That models involve three-dimensional shapes and that 
representational paintings involve combinations of more than one 
shade of colour is part of the criteria for depiction that 
characterize, respectively, the media of models and paintings: it is 
part of their representational forms. Furthermore, just as it belongs 
to the medium of models that they must involve three-
dimensionality, it belongs to the medium of, say, the English 
language that verbs should conjugate in specific manners. That is, 
the linguistic conventions of natural languages constitute their 
representational forms.
14
  
It is important to emphasise that the representational form of a 
picture is not, for Wittgenstein, something that is shared by the 
picture and the depicted possible state. For instance, a three-
dimensional model can be used to represent a two-dimensional 
                                                          
12
 Although their positions are, of course, very different, a similar understanding of this 
notion of representational form as encapsulating the criteria or conventions of a particular 
medium or system of representation can be found in Hacker (1986: 59), Kenny (1973: 57) 
and McGinn (2006: 92). 
13
 We can, however, use it to represent in another medium, for instance by treating the 
sheet as a word in the medium of language.   
14
 It is likely that Wittgenstein would have had a similar approach to the representational 
form of thoughts. Here, it suffices to note that there is evidence to suggest that non-
elementary thinking is performed in specific natural languages, in his view (Tejedor 2015: 
ch. 3). 
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possible state; a painting can be used to represent an invisible, 
colourless melody, etc. The notion of representational form is not 
associated with what is shared by the picture and the possible state 
it depicts; it is associated with the criteria or conventions belonging 
to a particular medium or pictorial system: with the principles that 
govern that medium.
15
  
In contrast, the notions of structure, pictorial form and logical 
form are closely associated with what is essential to representation – 
that is, what is universally part of representation, without which 
something would simply not count as a representation or a picture. 
Let us consider each of these briefly in turn. 
For Wittgenstein, it is essential to a picture that it should have a 
structure. The structure of a picture is its determinate arrangement 
of logical elements. This notion of a logical element is key since, for 
him, understanding a picture involves understanding the logical 
elements of the picture (cf. TLP 4.024).
16
 In the case of 
propositions, these logical elements are expressed by elements of 
the propositional sign; in the case of thoughts, by elements of the 
psychical sign; in iconic pictures, by elements of the iconic sign. It 
is important to emphasise here that the structure of a picture is its 
truth-functional structure: Wittgenstein indicates this repeatedly, in 
different sections of the Tractatus (TLP 4.1211, 5.13, 5.2ff).
17
 The 
whole structure of a picture is therefore something that would only 
come fully into view if we had the particular, complete logical 
                                                          
15
 In the Tractatus, the representational form of a picture encapsulates its accidental 
aspects – those aspects that are not essential to representation, but that result from the 
(optional) medium or pictorial system in question. Insofar as elementary pictures possess 
no accidental features, they therefore possess no representational form for Wittgenstein 
(cf. TLP 3.341, TLP 3.3411). 
16
 Wittgenstein admits that we do not have a grasp of what takes place at the ultimate 
level of analysis, since no complete analysis of any picture has ever been carried out (TLP 
5.55). Nevertheless, since logical structure is truth-functional, understanding a picture 
must involve having enough of a grasp of the initial stages of analysis to grasp – at the 
very least – what the logical elements of the picture are and what they signify. Cf. 
Wittgenstein’s discussion of ‘Ambulo’ (TLP 4.032). 
17
 Elementary propositions are truth-functions of themselves, therein lies their truth-
functional structure. 
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analysis into which the picture in question decomposes (TLP 2.034, 
2.15).
18
  
In turn, Wittgenstein indicates that the pictorial form of a 
picture is ‘the possibility of [its] structure’ (TLP 2.15). Pictorial 
form is what is shared by a picture and the possible state it depicts 
which enables the picture to represent the state in the particular way it 
does (TLP 2.15, TLP 2.151, TLP 2.17).
19
 The notion of pictorial 
form, unlike that of representational form, is therefore primarily 
associated with that which is shared by a picture and a possible state. 
Imagine that we are using a three-dimensional multi-tonal coloured 
shape first to represent a three-dimensional monochrome possible 
situation and then to represent a two-dimensional multi-tonal 
coloured shape. In the first instance, we would be dealing with a 
picture whose pictorial form consists, in part, of its three-
dimensionality, but not its multi-tonality of colour (since the latter 
is not shared by the depicted possible state); in the second instance, 
the reverse would be the case. In both cases, these aspects of 
pictorial form amount to a matter of resemblance – more 
specifically, resemblance with respect to a sense-perceivable quality.  
Consider, in contrast, how Wittgenstein introduces the notion 
of logical form.  
What every picture, of whatever form, must have in common with 
reality in order to be able to represent it at all —rightly or falsely— is 
the logical form, that is, the form of reality. (TLP 2.18) [My italics] 
For Wittgenstein, the notions of logical and pictorial form are both 
related to what is shared by a picture and its depicted possible state, 
which enables the former to represent the latter. Logical form is 
what enables the picture to depict the possible state at all (cf. 
Hacker 1986: 59, and Kenny, 1973: 57). Logical form for 
Wittgenstein consists in logical analysability: it manifests itself in 
that pictures and the possible states they depict have logical 
                                                          
18
 In parallel, Wittgenstein suggests that the structure of a possible state consists in the 
particular logical combination of the states of affairs into which the possible state 
decomposes. 
19
 Hacker and Kenny give a similar initial account of pictorial form, although our 
positions ultimately diverge – (Hacker 1986: 59 and Kenny 1973: 57). 
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analyses that mirror each other. Logical form is therefore what 
renders any pictorial structure – in any medium – possible: all 
pictures possess it, if they are to count as pictures at all.  
Wittgenstein indicates that logical form is an aspect of pictorial 
form. He also indicates that, in the case of some pictures (notably 
propositions and thoughts), pictorial form is exhausted by this very 
aspect: unlike in the case of iconic pictures, the pictorial form of 
thoughts and propositions is exhausted by their logical form (TLP 
2.181, TLP 3, TLP 4.03). All pictures are logical pictures in the 
broad sense that all possess logical form. However, propositions 
and thoughts (unlike iconic pictures) are also logical pictures in a 
narrower respect: their pictorial form is exhausted by their logical 
form.  
2. Ineffability and the Forms of the Natural Sciences 
Having examined Wittgenstein’s treatment of the forms of pictures, 
it is important to consider a related puzzle, which has tended to go 
unnoticed in the literature. This puzzle concerns the Tractatus’ view 
that form is ineffable. Wittgenstein draws a clear association 
between the notion of form and that of ineffability. Form cannot 
be said – and this applies to logical, pictorial and representational 
forms: “Propositions cannot represent logical form: it is mirrored 
in them” (TLP 4.121); “A picture cannot, however, depict its 
pictorial form: it displays it” (TLP 2.172); “A picture cannot, 
however, place itself outside its representational form” (TLP 
2.174). 
This is puzzling. For, whilst it may – perhaps – be possible to 
account for the ineffability of logical and pictorial forms by 
appealing to an understanding of what is essential to pictures 
generally or to the internal relation between pictures and depicted 
states, these options are not available in the case of representational 
form. Indeed, as we have just seen, representational form relates to 
the accidental, conventional aspects of pictures: representational 
form encapsulates the conventions that render representation 
possible in a particular medium, the criteria for correct representation 
in that particular representational system – for instance, the 
grammatical conventions in the English language. In what respect 
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are the conventional principles that govern English grammar 
ineffable though? And what is the status of the propositions that 
express these conventions (these conventional principles)? Are they 
senseful? Senseless? Nonsensical? Exploring these questions yields 
some interesting conclusions that help to shed light on 
Wittgenstein’s early understanding of form and, thereby, on his 
later notion of form of life. In order to show this, we need to 
consider how the Tractatus’ treatment of the forms of pictures 
relates to the treatment of form that emerges in his discussion of 
the natural sciences, in TLP 6.3–6.3751.   
In TLP 6.3–6.3751, Wittgenstein suggests that the forms of the 
natural sciences are both a priori (TLP 6.33) and optional (TLP 
6.341). They are a priori in that they provide instructions – in the 
shape of principles (which I call instruction-propositions) – for 
generating senseful representations (or pictures) within particular 
scientific systems. Insofar as these instructions are constitutive of 
the representational systems in question, the instructions – the 
principles – are prior to any senseful pictures (linguistic, mental or 
iconic) generated within those systems:20 they are, in this particular 
respect, a priori. In turn, the systems are optional in that we can opt 
to move from one system to another – for instance, in Physics, we 
can move from a system that allows for causal action at a distance 
to a system that does not allow for it. Let us consider these ideas in 
a little more detail. 
Wittgenstein suggests that the principles of the natural sciences 
– i.e. the instruction-propositions – are a priori. He writes: 
All propositions, such as the law of induction, the law of continuity in 
nature, the law of least expenditure in nature, etc. etc., all these are a 
priori [insights – ‘Einsichten’ in the original] of possible forms of the 
propositions of science (TLP 6.34) 
In the previous entry, Wittgenstein is careful to note that the a 
priori insights in question are not a priori beliefs, but a type of a priori 
knowledge: 
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stipulating which system is at work. 
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We do not believe a priori in a law of conservation, but we know a priori 
the possibility of a logical form. (TLP 6.33) 
In my view, the understanding of knowledge at work in this remark 
is that of ability-knowledge or know-how. 21  According to the 
Tractatus, this type of knowing is not propositional – it does not 
consist in entertaining particular beliefs or mental representations 
(e.g. beliefs that are justified and true). Instead, it involves the 
ability to use signs in particular ways for specific purposes. Knowing the 
principles of a given natural science system therefore involves being 
able (knowing how) to construct senseful propositions according to a 
unified set of instructions – according to a ‘single plan’ (TLP 
6.343). What the unified set of instructions – the single plan – is, in 
any given system, is not something that can be represented by 
means of senseful propositions. Rather it is shown in the use we 
make of signs to express senseful propositions within that system. 
Our knowledge of these principles – and, therefore, our knowledge 
of the form in question – is prior to experience in that it is a type of 
constitutive know-how: it is the know-how that enables us to 
construct senseful representations (propositions, iconic pictures, 
but also mental representations, including beliefs and experiences) 
according to the instructions pertaining to a particular system; it is, 
as noted above, prior to any senseful thoughts (including 
experiences) and propositions generated within that system – it is a 
priori.  
Whilst Wittgenstein suggests that the form and associated set of 
principles of a given system are a priori, he also notes they are 
optional (‘beliebig’ in the original) (cf. TLP 6.341) – in that there 
are ‘different systems of describing the world’. He writes: “This 
form is [optional] […] To the different networks correspond 
different systems of describing the world” (TLP 6.341). 
For Wittgenstein, these different forms – with their different 
associated sets of principles or instruction-propositions – are 
optional in that we can opt for one or other of them (and their 
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associated principles) (TLP 6.341).
22
 These forms are not, 
therefore, essential – or universal – requirements of language or 
representation. The implication here is that it is possible to 
construct a description of the world without adopting any of these 
forms – that is, without adopting any one in particular of these sets 
of principles from the natural sciences: we can, for instance, 
construct a description of the world with a system in Physics that 
does not allow for action at a distance.  
Part of the idea here is that the forms of the natural sciences are 
optional in that they consist of features that are accidental – not 
essential or universal – to representation: scientific forms are akin 
to conventional representational forms, not to universal logical form. A 
senseful proposition generated according to the principles of a 
system in the natural sciences will thus display a variety of forms: 
insofar as it is senseful, it will display essential logical form; insofar 
as it depicts reality according to a particular system from within the 
natural sciences, it will display the accidental form associated with 
that system; and insofar as it is (say) an English language 
proposition, it will display a particular, accidental representational 
form (i.e. that associated with the conventions of the English 
language). 
For Wittgenstein, the notion of form is intimately connected 
with those of activity and use, since form – e.g. the form of a 
proposition, of a thought, of an iconic picture, etc. – is shown in 
the activity of using of signs. Consider the logical form of a picture – 
that is, a picture’s analysability into elementary pictures. 
Wittgenstein suggests that, when we use signs to express a senseful 
picture (be it a senseful proposition, a thought or an iconic picture), 
this use of signs shows the logical form of the picture. The use of 
signs shows that we are expressing a picture with a determinate 
sense and therefore a picture ultimately analysable into logically 
independent elementary pictures consisting of simple names. 
Wittgenstein indicates that logical form is an essential feature of 
senseful pictures qua pictures. Indeed, if our use of signs did not 
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 McGuinness writes that Wittgenstein’s ‘view is a variant of the conventionalism not 
uncommon in his day’ (2002: 127).  
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express a determinate sense and thereby showed logical form, it 
would not count as expressing a picture at all: it would not count as 
representational, according to the Tractatus. 
Whilst logical form is, in this respect, an essential feature of 
senseful pictures, representational form – say, that a proposition is 
expressed in English rather than Spanish – is not. Like logical form, 
however, the representational form of a picture is shown in our use 
of signs. However, the representational form of a picture is not 
essential to it qua picture. The representational form of pictures – 
be they propositions, thoughts or iconic pictures – is, as we have 
just seen, associated with their accidental features. These accidental 
features emerge as a result of the ‘tacit conventions’ that are ‘a part 
of the human organism’ (TLP [Pears& McGuinness] 4.002 – my italics). 
The fact that certain psychological, biological, etc. traits happen to 
be distributed amongst human beings in the ways that they are and 
that human beings tend to act in particular ways, together with 
other facts about our physical environment, constitute what 
Wittgenstein calls the ‘human organism’. The conventions that 
make up the accidental features of pictures are therefore also part 
of this organism – of this complex interweaving of facts about 
human nature and facts about our physical environment. One of 
the respects in which these conventions are accidental is therefore 
that they can change over time, as the facts about human beings 
and the facts about our physical environment themselves change.  
For Wittgenstein, those aspects of the use of signs that show 
logical form circumscribe what counts – essentially or universally – 
as senseful representation (in language, thought, or iconic 
depicting). In contrast, those that show representational form 
circumscribe what counts as expressing sense in a particular 
representational medium. Consider, for instance, the sentence ‘Cat 
the this dog ate’. This sentence fails to show the representational 
form of the English language – i.e. it does not express something 
that counts as an English-language proposition – in that it does not 
abide by the conventions of English. The notion of 
representational form aims to capture those conventional principles 
that govern the construction of senseful pictures within the 
medium in question; insofar as these principles convey instructions 
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for the construction of pictures within particular media, they are 
constitutive of those media, and therefore a priori like scientific 
forms. At the same time, representational forms are, like scientific 
forms, optional: we can opt to depict a particular state of affairs in 
one pictorial medium or another, in one natural language or 
another.  
It is clear, therefore, that there are important parallels between 
the notion of optional form in the natural sciences and that of 
representational form. Interestingly enough, Wittgenstein suggests 
that scientific forms are ineffable in spite of being optional – just as 
representational forms are: 
If there were a law of causality, it might be put in the following way: 
There are laws of nature. 
But of course that cannot be said: it makes itself manifest. (TLP 6.36) 
Why, however, should scientific and representational forms be 
regarded as ineffable? And how does their ineffability relate to the 
ineffability of (essential, not optional) logical form?  
A form, as we have just seen, is a unified set of instructions for 
the generation of senseful pictures. The instructions in question 
can be essential to representation (i.e. pertinent to the generation of 
all pictures) – as in logical form – or they can be optional – as in 
representational and scientific forms. Now, arrangements of signs 
(be they physical, as in linguistic and iconic signs, or psychical as in 
mental signs) can be used to express instructions. For Wittgenstein, 
whether an arrangement of signs expresses an instruction or a 
senseful picture is not determined by the material of which it made 
– in particular, whether the signs are made of physical or of 
psychical stuff. Instead, it is determined by the role the signs play: by 
how they are used. Use exhausts the distinction between 
instructions and senseful pictures. Sentences can be used to express 
form, but, when they do, they are expressing instructions. The role of 
expressing instructions is different from the role of expressing 
pictures (i.e. of representing possible states). The two roles have to 
be distinct and mutually exclusive, insofar as all there is to the 
distinction between pictures and instructions is precisely such a 
difference in roles: the same sign can be used to express a picture or 
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to express an instruction, and the difference lies precisely – and 
exclusively – in this use: in the role that the sign is being made to 
play. Hence, if an arrangement of signs is used to express a picture, 
it is not used to express an instruction – and, vice-versa. It is in this 
respect, I suggest, that form (i.e. a unified system of instructions) 
cannot be depicted or sensefully represented. 
Form can be expressed insofar as sentences can be used to 
convey instructions. Expressing logical instructions (i.e. instructions 
relating to logical form) can serve the psychological purpose of 
providing reminders, as we saw above. Expressing natural science 
principles or natural language conventions can serve the purpose of 
stipulating which of the various optional systems we are adopting. 
In both cases, however, the purposeful use of a sentence to express 
an instruction is different from the purposeful use of a sentence to 
depict a possible state. If a sentence is used to express an 
instruction, it is not simultaneously used to depict or say. It is in this 
deflated respect that all forms, including (optional) representational 
and scientific forms, are ineffable (i.e. cannot be said) for 
Wittgenstein. 
3. Representational systems conditioned – but not justified 
– by reality 
According to the Tractatus, a scientific law of nature is not a 
possible state represented by a senseful proposition and capable, 
when obtaining, of justifying or grounding scientific language. Nor are 
laws of nature necessary and, for this reason, capable of justifying 
such language. For the purpose of a law is simply not to justify: as 
we saw earlier, not even the tautological laws of logic play such a 
role, since it is to misconceive the notion of a logical law to assume, 
as Frege and Russell do, that they serve to justify or ground the 
logical practices of deductive inference (TLP 5.132). 
Instead, for Wittgenstein, the notion of law – or principle – 
associated with the natural sciences is that of an instruction for the 
construction of senseful propositions within a particular, unified natural science 
system. Consider, for instance, the notion of a causal law of nature. 
According to the Tractatus, a causal law is a set of instructions for 
the use of causal signs, one that enables us to generate senseful 
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propositions of the form stipulated by the causal system in 
question. For the early Wittgenstein, it is part of the remit of 
physics to come up with the instructions or causal principles that 
best serve the instrumental purposes of the natural sciences and, 
more generally, of human beings. Causal laws are instructions that 
circumscribe what counts as a senseful proposition of the causal 
form (i.e. of the form ‘p causes q’) within the optional system in 
question. In so doing, causal laws rule out certain uses of signs as 
irrelevant or purposeless within the system in question. For 
instance, a system that allows for action at a distance will allow for 
senseful propositions involving the notion of a causally efficacious 
magnet; in contrast, a causal system that does not allow for action 
at a distance will not treat such propositions as senseful. One 
question we may ask at this stage is: what, according to 
Wittgenstein, is involved in opting to move from one system to 
another?  
I suggest that the process of moving from one scientific system 
to another involves a type of relative (i.e. instrumental, means-ends) 
evaluative judgement that would be describable in language and 
thinkable, according to Wittgenstein. In “A Lecture on Ethics”, 
Wittgenstein repeatedly aligns this form of instrumental evaluative 
judgement with the scientific approach to the world. He writes, for 
instance, that the ‘scientific book’ (LOE: 6) would be such as to:23 
contain all relative judgments of value and all true scientific 
propositions and in fact all true propositions that can be made. (LOE, 
p. 6)  
Although Wittgenstein does not discuss this idea explicitly in the 
Tractatus, it is likely that he regards shifts from one optional 
scientific system to another as involving precisely such ‘relative 
judgements of value’ (McGuinness 2002: 129 – 130). This type of 
judgment includes (though need not be restricted to) judgements as 
to which scientific representational system is best suited, 
instrumentally, to securing our survival. Shifts from one scientific 
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system to another will involve instrumental evaluative judgements 
that are informed by reality: by the facts.  
As we saw at the start of this paper, the notion of fact covers, in 
the Tractatus, both obtaining possible states (including physical 
states) and pictures (including propositions and thoughts). 
Wittgenstein’s decision to use the word ‘fact’ to cover both 
obtaining possible states (e.g. depicted physical facts) and pictures 
(including linguistic and mental ones) is not a terminological quirk, 
but part of his commitment to resist the a priori division of reality 
into metaphysically significant categories (e.g. the physical and the 
mental; or the physical and the inherently representational). 
Instead, for Wittgenstein, all facts are placed on the same level. 
This suggests that, in his view, shifts from one scientific 
representational system to another will be informed by the facts of 
our physical environment together with those facts pertaining to 
our human biology and psychology (human bodies and human 
thought).
 
The relative evaluative judgements involved in moving 
from one system to another are made against the background of 
these facts, where neither type of fact is privileged over the other.
 
I 
suggest that, for the early Wittgenstein, these facts – the facts that 
make up the ‘human organism’ (TLP 4.002), the physical facts of 
our environment and human biology together with mental facts of 
human psychology – do not ground, justify or determine our 
options, but constitute the background against which we make 
those instrumental evaluative judgements that lead us to opting for 
one representational system over another. These judgments are 
made by natural scientists in the case of scientific forms and 
systems; in the case of non-scientific representational systems (i.e. 
in the case of the representational form of pictures generally – e.g. 
the conventions of English grammar), they are culturally generated. 
In both cases, however, the nature of the judgment is the same: we 
opt for one representational system over another as a result of an 
instrumental, evaluative judgment made against a background of 
facts – the facts of the ‘human organism’ (TLP 4.002). 
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4. From Tractarian forms to forms of life 
In summary, according to the Tractatus, as we have just seen, the 
notion of form is associated with the possibility of generating 
senseful pictures. Logical form involves logical analysability – an 
analysability shared and co-mirrored by pictures and the possible 
states they depict. Logical form is essential or universal to all 
representation – to all picturing. Representational and scientific 
forms, in contrast, are not universal or essential to representation, 
but optional. They involve the conventions of particular 
representational media or scientific systems – conventions that 
make it possible to produce senseful pictures within those media or 
scientific systems. We opt into these conventional media and 
scientific systems following evaluative judgements that we make 
against the background of certain facts: facts pertaining to the 
human organism, that is, facts about our physical environment and 
about our human biology and psychology. These optional forms 
are internally related to logical form, in that they generate senseful, 
logical pictures (ones that are analysable into elementary 
arrangements of real names). In this respect, these optional forms 
are themselves logical forms – in the plural (TLP 2.182; TLP 6.33). 
All of these forms – the universal logical form in the singular 
and the optional logical forms in the plural – can be expressed by 
means of instruction-propositions: they can be expressed by using 
signs to instruct – or give orders (cf. PI 23) – relevant to the 
production of senseful propositions. In the case of universal logical 
form, the instruction-propositions in question act as reminders of a 
know-how we already possess, insofar as we already have mastery 
of senseful, logical language: they serve the purpose of reminding 
us of this know-how, when we end up deviating from it (in 
particular, when we are tempted by nonsensical metaphysical 
pseudo-language). In the case of the optional logical forms, in turn, 
the instruction-propositions serve to stipulate which of the various 
optional systems is at work. In both cases, form is ineffable in that 
the role played by signs to express instructions is different from the 
role played by signs to express senseful propositions or pictures – 
i.e. to say. Since the difference between instructing and depicting is 
exhausted by the use of signs – since this difference lies, exclusively, 
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in a different use of signs (and not, e.g. in the kind of stuff that the 
signs are made of, physical or mental) – it is not possible to use a 
sign to instruct and depict simultaneously: when a sign is used to 
instruct it is, for that very reason, not being used to depict – and 
vice-versa. Since form is expressed by instruction-propositions, it 
cannot therefore be expressed by depicting, senseful propositions: 
form (whether universal or optional) is ineffable. In my view, the 
ineffability of form reduces to this difference in roles: there is 
nothing more substantive to it than this. My understanding of 
ineffability in the Tractatus is, in this respect, deflationary. 
The differences and similarities between the Tractatus’ approach 
to form and the later conception of form(s) of life should, by now, 
be starting to emerge. First of all, it would be misleading to suggest 
that Wittgenstein moves from a Tractarian view that is blind to 
linguistic multiplicity to a later view that allows for such 
multiplicity. The Tractatus’ approach to representation allows for far 
more multiplicity than is commonly acknowledged, not only insofar 
as it allows for different optional depicting media and scientific 
systems, but insofar as it also allows for propositions that express 
instructions (akin to orders) – propositions that are not senseful, 
senseless or nonsensical. The central difference between 
Wittgenstein’s earlier and later approaches does not lie, therefore, 
in its tolerance of multiplicity.
 24
 Instead, it lies in the fact that, in 
moving from his earlier to his later philosophy, Wittgenstein loses a 
key piece in his Tractarian arsenal – the notion of logical 
analysability, of analysability into logically independent, elementary 
arrangements of simple units: logical form.  
With the dissolution of universal logical form, Wittgenstein is 
left with two notions already present, though comparatively less 
saliently, in the Tractatus: the idea of a multiplicity of optional 
representational media and scientific systems (the optional forms); 
and the idea of the ‘human organism’, that is of those facts relating 
to human biology, psychology and the human physical 
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 For a more detailed discussion, see (Tejedor 2015: chaps. 4 & 5). I cannot think of any 
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praying.  
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environment that condition our moving between optional systems. 
The Tractarian notion of optional (representational and scientific) 
forms evolve into the idea of a multiplicity of forms of human life 
(in the plural); the notion of optional representational systems into 
the idea of a multiplicity of language-games. In turn, the Tractarian 
notion of a human organism evolves into the idea of a single, 
unified form of human life – a collection of facts that condition 
human activity universally.
25
 In connection to the latter, we see 
emerge in the Investigations, like in the Tractatus, the idea that 
language is a part of the human organism:  
Everyday language is a part of the human organism [‘ein Teil des 
menschlichen Organismus’] and is no less complicated than it. (TLP 
4.002) 
the term ‘language-game’ is meant to bring into prominence the fact 
that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life. 
(PI 23) 
In the Tractatus, we find that logical form and the optional 
(representational and scientific) forms are internally related to each 
other, since all pictures (no matter what their optional forms) are, 
at the same time, logical pictures. Logical form does not justify or 
determine the shape of optional pictorial and scientific systems (the 
optional principles that govern them – their optional forms); it is, 
however, constitutive of them (in an immanent, non-foundational 
sense) since all of these optional systems, insofar as they are 
representational at all, are also logical systems: they are systems of 
facts in logical space. 
In his post-Tractatus periods, with the demise of logical form, 
the idea of facts being in logical space gives way to a notion that is 
already present in the Tractatus, but which only gains full 
prominence in his later writings: the notion of the human 
organism, the facts most directly relevant to human life. These 
include the facts about our physical environment, about our human 
biology and about our human psychology. These facts, put 
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 On the distinction between the human form of life and the forms of human life, see 
Danièle Moyal-Sharrock “Wittgenstein on Forms of Life, Patterns of Life, and Forms of 
Being” in this issue of NWR: 22–25; 31–33. 
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together, do not determine or justify the cultures and linguistic 
systems that emerge from them – just as logical form did not 
determine or justify representational and scientific forms in the 
Tractatus. But our different human cultures and linguistic systems 
do nevertheless emerge from complex evaluative judgments made 
against the background of (and informed by) these facts. In this 
way, we find that our differently enculturated human forms of life 
are internally related to the facts of the human organism – that is, 
to the universally human form of life.  These considerations point, 
I suggest, to a non-univocal understanding of Wittgenstein’s use of 
‘form of life’ in his later writings. 
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